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Writing Requirements
1. I)mowrOi)foN
Plaintiff, upon resignation as president and chief executive officer of a bank,
demanded that the bank's majority stockholder repurchase all shares of bank
stock that plaintiff had acquired during his tenure with the bank. When the
majority stockholder refused, plaintiff filed suit alleging detrimental reliance on
the majority stockholder's oral promises to repurchase the shares in the event of
plaintiff's resignation. These promises were allegedly made during contract
negotiations before plaintiff was hired.'
After a trial on the merits, the jury granted a verdict in favor of plaintiff
which was affirmed by the appellate court.2 The Louisiana Supreme Court,
applying Louisiana's pre-1985 law of detrimental reliance, reversed. Held: the
statutory requirement that a contract for the sale of securities be in writing
precluded recovery based on detrimental reliance.?
Because the alleged promises of the majority stockholder were made in
1984, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not apply Louisiana Civil Code article
1967, which became effective January 1, 1985;' rather, the court applied the pre-
1985 Louisiana law of detrimental reliance.'
Article 1967, the first legislative recognition of the doctrine of detrimental
reliance in Louisiana, expressly precludes recovery for reliance on gratuitous
promises not made in the statutorily-required form.6 However, neither the text
of Article 1967, nor its official comments, mentions the availability of recovery
for a promisee's detrimental reliance on an onerous promise not made in the
statutorily-required form.
The statutory writing requirement for the sale of securities cited by the
Morris court, Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:8-319, stated in pertinent part:
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by way of
action or defense unless:
Copyright 1997, by LOUISZANA LAW REvIEW.
1. Morris v. Friedman. 663 So. 2d 19, 21 (La. 1995).
2. Morris v. People's Bank & Trust Co. of Natchitoches, 642 So. 2d 225 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1994). rev'd. 663 So. 2d 19 (1995).
3. Morris, 663 So. 74 . 726.
4. 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § I.
5. Morris, 663 So. 2d at 24-26.
6. La. Civ. Code art. 1967 states in pertinent part:
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have known that the
promise would Induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was
reasonable In so relying. Recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the
damages suffered as a result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a
gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reasonable,
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(a) there is some writing signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker,
sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made for sale of
a stated quantity of described securities at a defined or stated
price.
?
This statute was subsequently amended and reenacted by the Louisiana
Legislature in 1995, eliminating the requirement of a writing for contracts for the
sale or purchase of securities However, Louisiana law still contains numerous
provisions which require certain types of onerous contracts to be in writing in
order to be enforceable.
Therefore, given the co-existence of Article 1967 and the statutory writing
requirements for onerous contracts, the issue becomes whether an aggreived
promisee can recover, on the basis of Article 1967, for reliance on an onerous
promise not made in the statutorily-required form.
This issue is not unique to Louisiana. For over a century, common law
courts have wrestled with the same issue, though "couched" in common law
terminology. That is, whether the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel
can be invoked to overcome a Statute of Frauds defense."0
This paper discusses: (1) the law of detrimental reliance in Louisiana prior
to the enactment of Article 1967; (2) the evolution of Article 1967; (3) the
statutory writing requirements and their role in Louisiana law; (4) the common
law courts' treatment of a similar issue; and (5) the Louisiana Supreme Court's
decision in Morris v. Friedman.
This paper concludes with an analysis of the likely effect Article 1967
would have had on the Morris case. In this conclusion I contend, based on
statutory interpretation, legislative intent, and existing case law, that
recovery should be allowed to aggreived promisees for their reasonable
reliance on onerous promises of the promisor, despite the lack of a
statutorily-required writing.
7. La. R.S. 10:8-319 (1983).
8. La. R.S. 1&8-319 (1983) was amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 884, § I and reenacted as
La. R.S. 10:8-113 (1983), effective January 1, 1996. La. R.S. 10:8-113 (1983) states in pertinent
part "A contract or modification of a contract for the sale or purchase of a security is enforceable
whether or not there is a writing signed or record authenticated by a party against whom enforcement
is sought."
9. See. e.g., . Civ. Code art. 3038 on "suretyship" and art. 2440 on "sale of immovables."
10. See generally Michael B. Metzger and Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Section
2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 Vill. L. Rev. 63 (1980).
The common law doctrine of "promissory estoppel" is very similar to, and is in fact the source of.
Louisiana's detrimental reliance. See infra text accompanying notes 20-29.
The common law's Statute of Frauds is synonymous with Louisiana's statutory writing
requirements. See infra text accompanying notes 30-44. Hence, a Statute of Frauds defense
is one in which a party alleges the contract at issue is unenforceable for lack of a required
writing.
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II. PRE-1985 LAW OF DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
Although the enactment of Article 1967 in 1984 was the first legislative
recognition of the doctrine of detrimental reliance in Louisiana, Louisiana courts
have, for nearly a century, enforced promises on the basis of that doctrine."
For example, in an 1896 case, defendant promised plaintiffs that the remains of
their ancestor would not be disturbed.'2 Nevertheless, defendant subsequently
attempted to remove the remains from the place of burial, and plaintiffs invoked
the doctrine of detrimental reliance.) The Louisiana Supreme Court granted
a permanent injunction to prevent the removal of the remains and held that "[t]he
principle of estoppel ... will not permit the withdrawal of promises or
engagements on which another has acted.""
In another early detrimental reliance case, an employer's offer to plaintiff of
a benefit plan at the employer's expense was enforced on the basis of detrimental
reliance when the employee to whom the offer was made remained in the
employer's service in reliance on the offer.' s Reliance was also the basis of a
vessel owner's recovery when he relied to his detriment on a pipeline owner's
promise of payment.'6
Although detrimental reliance has been applied in a variety of factual
situations, "Louisiana courts have not been uniformly receptive to an aggrieved
party's invocation of detrimental reliance, particularly when it has been overtly
characterized as the promissory estoppel of the Restatement of Contracts. "7
For example, in the landmark case of Ducote v. Oden,'8 the Louisiana Supreme
Court rejected the plaintiff's claim of detrimental reliance, holding that
promissory estoppel had no place in Louisiana law.'9
IlI. THE EvoLuTioN OF LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE ARTICLE 1967
Although rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Ducote, the common
law doctrine of promissory estoppel is the primary source of detrimental reliance
in Louisiana Civil Code article 1967.20 In fact, "promissory estoppel is the
11. Shael Herman, Detrimental Reliance in Louisiana Lw-Past, Present, and Future(?): The
Code Drofter's Perspective, 58 Tul. L Rev. 707, 715 (1984).
12. Choppin v. LaBranche, 48 La. Ann. 1217, 20 So. 681 (1896).
13. Id. at 1218.19, 20 So. at 681.
14. Id. at 1218, 20 So. at 682.
15. Robinson v. Standard Oil Co., 180 So. 237 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
16. Continental Casualty Co. v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., 447 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1971).
17. Herman, supra note 11. at 716.
18. 59 So. 2d 130 (La. 1952).
19. Id at 132.
20. Jon C. Adeock, The 1984 Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code' s Articles on Obligations-A
Student Symposium: Detrimental Reliance, 45 La.L.Rev. 753, 754 (1985).
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doctrine the Louisiana State Law Institute asked the reporter to the revision of
the Louisiana Civil Code on Obligations to incorporate into the Civil Code."'"
Professor Saul Litvinoff, the reporter and chief drafter of the revision, captured
the essence of the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel in his original draft
of Article 1967.2 Citing Section 90 of the Restatement Second of Contracts as
a source, the original draft read in pertinent part as follows: "One party's
reasonable reliance on a promise by the other may be valid cause for an obligation
of the other if the latter knew or should have known that his promise could induce
the former party to rely on it to his detriment."'
At the request of other Law Institute members,u however, the draft was
significantly modified by the addition of a last sentence which stated: "Reliance
on a promise made without required formalities is not reasonable."2 The draft
was further modified by the addition of the word "gratuitous" to the last sen-
tence.26 Accordingly, the last sentence stated: "Reliance on a gratuitous promise
made without required formalities is not reasonable."2 7 Thus, the motive behind
the addition of the last sentence was to make it "as clear as possible that reliance
on a donation promised without proper form will not be protected. 28
Thus, Article 1967, adopted by the Law Institute and enacted by the
Louisiana Legislature, now reads in pertinent part as follows:
A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or should have
known that the promise would induce the other party to rely on it to his
detriment and the other party was reasonable in so relying. Recovery
may be limited to the expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a
result of the promisee's reliance on the promise. Reliance on a
gratuitous promise made without required formalities is not reason-
able."
IV. STATUTORY WRITING REQUIREMENTS IN LOUISIANA LAW
Like other Louisiana courts, the Morris court referred to the statutory writing
requirement for contracts for the sale or purchase of securities as a "Statute of
21. Id.
22. Saul Litvlnoff, Obligations Revision-Article 2 of Cause. Reporter's note prepared for the
Feb. 18, 1983 meeting of the Louisiana State Law Institute Council (on file with the Louisiana State
Law Institute).
23. Saul Litvinoff, Obligations Revision-Cause, Reporter's note prepared for the Apr. 20,1979
meeting of the Louisiana State Law Institute Council (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute),
24. Adcock, supra note 20, at 754 n.7.
25. Litvinoff, supra note 22.
26. Minutes from the Feb. 18-19, 1983 meeting of the Louisiana State Law Institute Council
[hereinafter Low Institute Minutes] (on file with the Louisiana State Law Institute).
27. Id
28. Litvinoff, supra note 22, at 1.
29. La. Civ. Code art. 1967; 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § I; Law Institute Minutes, supra note 26.
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Frauds" requirement.30 Originating at early common law, the Statute of Frauds
has evolved into a set of legal rules, varying in each jurisdiction, requiring that
certain types of contracts be in writing to be enforceable." Thus, the "Statute
of Frauds" requirement is synonymous with the term "statutory writing require-
ment" more commonly used in Louisiana.
The main policy behind a writing requirement is that of obviating pejury by
the contracting parties.32 Another related policy is that of mitigating the effects
of false testimony, as parties may fail to accurately recollect the terms of their
agreement. 3 This desire to mitigate the effects of false testimony is especially
strong when much time has passed between the time of the disputed agreement
and the time of trial.3' The requirement of a writing also encourages parties to
give their pending agreements and the resulting legal obligations serious and
deliberate thought prior to contracting.3
Louisiana's writing requirements for onerous contracts presently consist of
nine legislative acts: (1) Louisiana Civil Code article 183936 ("transfer of
immovable property"); (2) Louisiana Civil Code article 24403 ("sale of
immovables"); (3) Louisiana Revised Statutes 3:341438 ("commodity dealer and
warehouse law"); (4) Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3572. 1039 ("consumer loan
brokers"); (5) Louisiana Civil Code article 317640 ("antichresis"); (6) Louisiana
Civil Code article 1847 4 ("promise to pay debt of a third person or debt
30. Morris v. Friedman, 663 So. 2d 19, 23 (La. 1995).
31. See generally John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, Contracts 774-76 (3d ed. 1987).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id&
36. La. Civ. Code art. 1839 states in pertinent part: "A transfer of immovable property must
be made by authentic act or by act under private signature. Nevertheless, an oral transfer is valid
between the parties when the property has been actually delivered and the transferor recognizes the
transfer when interrogated on oath." 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § i. effective January 1, 1985.
37. La. Civ. Code art. 2440 states: "A sale or promise of sale of an immovable must be made
by authentic act or by act under private signature, except as provided in Article 1839." 1993 La.
Acts No. 841, § 1, effective January 1. 1995.
38. La. R.S. 3:3414 (1991) states: "All contracts, other than contracts for spot sale, in which
title shall pass shall be evidenced in writing." 1982 La. Acts No. 563, § 1, effective January 1, 1983.
39. La. R.S. 9:3572.10 (1991) states in pertinent part: "Every consumer loan brokerage contract
shall be in writing and signed by all contracting parties." 1986 La. Acts No. 729, § 1.
40. La. Civ. Code art. 3176 states in pertinent part: "The antichresis shall be reduced to
writing." An antichresis is a species of mortgage of immovables and is of civilian origin. More
specifically, it is an agreement by which the debtor gives to his creditor the fruits or income from
the immovable property which he has pledged, in lieu of the interest on his debt. The antichresis is
an antiquated contract and Is used in Louisiana only in rare circumstances. Black's Law Dictionary
92-93 (6th ed. 1990).
41. La. Civ. Code art. 1847 states: "Parol evidence is inadmissible to establish a promise to
pay the debt of a third person or a promise to pay a debt extinguished by prescription." 1984 La.
Acts No. 331, § 1, effective January 1, 1985.
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extinguished by prescription"); (7) Louisiana Civil Code article 233142
("matrimonial agreement"); (8) Louisiana Civil Code article 3038 3 ("surety-
ship"); and (9) Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:1752" ("inter vivos trust").
There is no mention either in the texts of these provisions or in their official
comments of the availability of detrimental reliance as an "estoppel" to the
promisor's invocation of the lack of a writing requirement to deny enforceability
of an oral agreement. Thus, to resolve the issue of whether an aggreived
promisee can recover on the basis of Article 1967 for reliance on an onerous
promise not made in the statutorily-required form, one must consult other
sources, such as jurisprudence, statutory interpretation, and legislative intent.
V. THE COMMON LAW EXPERIENCE
As previously noted, common law courts have wrestled with the same issue
(couched in common law terminology) of whether promissory estoppel may be
invoked to overcome a Statute of Frauds defense.4
Jurisdictions opposed to the recognition of promissory estoppel as a means
of circumventing the Statute of Frauds have contended that such recognition
would result, in effect, in the abrogation of the statute." In addition, other
courts have expressed the related concern that allowing promissory estoppel to
circumvent the Statute of Frauds would amount to a usurpation of legislative
power"
However, in spite of such concerns, a landmark opinion from the Supreme
Court of California provided the catalyst for the development of promissory
estoppel as a judicially-created means by which to circumvent the Statute of
Frauds. In Monarco v. LoGreco,5 Justice Traynor, writing for the court,
rejected the notion that recovery under estoppel can be based only on representa-
tions by a party that he will execute a writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds; or
that a writing is not necessary for enforceability; or that he will not rely on the
Statute of Frauds as a defense.49 Justice Traynor stated that courts should
instead focus on the promise and the promisee's substantial reliance on that
42. La. Civ. Code art. 2331 states: "A matrimonial agreement may be executed by the spouses
before or during marraige. It shall be made by authentic act or by an act under private signature duly
acknowledged by the spouses." 1979 La. Acts No. 709, § 1, effective January 1. 1980.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 3038 states: "Suretyship must be express and in writing." 1987 La. Acts
No. 409, § 1. effective January I, 1988.
44. La. R.S. 9:1752 (1991) states: "An inter vivos trust may be created only by authentic act
or by act under private signature executed in the presence of two witnesses and duly acknowledged
by the settlor or by the affidavit of one of the attesting witnesses." 1964 La. Acts No. 338, § 2.
45. See generally Metzger, supra note 10, at 78-91; John E. Murray Jr., Murray on Contracts
359 (3d ed. 1990); Calamari and Perillo, supra note 31, at 841-44.
46. Metzger, supra note 10, at 82.
47. Id
48. 220 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1950).
49. Id at 740-41.
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promise." Though the Monarco court clearly invited the application of
promissory estoppel to overcome a Statute of Frauds defense, "its emphasis upon
unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment which could not be adequately
remedied through restitution" has proven to be an effective deterrent to some
courts' willingness to allow the invocation of promissory estoppel to overcome
a Statute of Frauds defense."'
The trend toward allowing promissory estoppel as a means of circumventing
the Statute of Frauds gained additional momentum from the promulgation of
section 139 of the Restatement Second of Contracts. 2 Section 139 essentially
provides that a promise, which the promisor should foresee will induce reliance on
the part of the promisee and which does in fact induce reliance of the promisee, is
"enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise." 3 Section 139 has found support from a number
of courts addressing the issue.'
Furthermore, a number of decisions recognize promissory estoppel as an
independent theory of recovery; i.e., as a separate and additional basis of recovery
in addition to recovery under contract." These decisions suggest that promissory
estoppel claims are not barred by the Statute of Frauds because promissory estoppel
is not conitractually-based and thus is beyond the scope of the Statute of Frauds.'
However, some courts have refused to adopt promissory estoppel as a means
of overcoming the writing requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 7 In addition,
50. Id. at 741.
51. Murray, supra note 45. at 359.
52. ld at 360.
.53. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 (1979). Section 139 states in pertinent part:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forebearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the
action or forebearance is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach is to be
limited as justice requires.
54. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177, 181 (Haw. 1970) ("[w]e think that the
approach taken in the Restatement is the proper method of giving the trial court the necessary latitude
to relieve a party of the hardships of the Statute of Frauds."); Cooper v. Re-Max Wyandotte Cty. Real
Estate, Inc., 736 P.2d 900. 907 (Kan. 1987) (oral contracts within the Statute of Frauds will be
enforced, in spite of the Statute of Frauds, if there are compelling equitable considerations such that
Injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of the contract).
55. See, e.8., Oruen Indus., Inc. v. Biller. 608 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1979); R.S. Bennett & Co.
v. Economy Mechanical Indus., Inc.. 606 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1979).
56. Gruen Indus., 608 F.2d at 280-82 (considering recovery based on promissory estoppel
despite dismissal of a contract claim barred by the Statute of Frauds); R.S. Bennett & Co., 606 F.2d
at 188 (pernitting assertion of promissory estoppel notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds' bar to
recovery under contract).
57. See. e.g.. Anderson Constr. Co., Inc. v. Lyon Metal Prod., Inc., 370 So. 2d 935, 937 (Miss.
1979) (to allow promissory estoppel as an exception to the Statute of Frauds would "destroy the
purpose of the statute to prevent frauds and perjurles"); Florida Power & LightCo. v. American Ltd.,
511 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 1987) ("(p]romissory estoppel is not a valid bar to the
statute of frauds defense under Florida law").
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some courts have adhered to the analysis set forth by Justice Traynor in
Monarco.B For example, in a recent decision, an Indiana appellate court
refused to adopt section 139 of the Restatement Second of Contracts and, instead,
adhered to the requirement of "an unjust and unconscionable injury and loss" in
order to remove a contract from the operation of the Statute of Frauds.'
Another recent opinion suggests that a party seeking to use promissory estoppel
in order to take a contract "out" of the Statute of Frauds "must demonstrate that
the circumstances are such as to render it unconscionable to deny the oral
promise."
Hence, the prevailing view among common law jurisdictions seems to be
one of allowing promissory estoppel as a means of overcoming a Statute of
Frauds defense. However, to paraphrase two commentators on the issue, the
promissory estoppel/Statute of Frauds jurisprudence is a remarkably incoherent
body of case law and, therefore, it may be premature to suggest the common
law's general acceptance of promissory estoppel as a means of overcoming or
circumventing the Statute of Frauds. 1
VI. MORRIS V. FRIEDMAN
In 1984, Sam Friedman ("Friedman") recruited Huey Morris ("Morris") as
the president and chief executive officer of People's Bank & Trust Company of
Natchitoches, Louisiana ("the Bank"). Friedman was the majority stockholder
of the Bank.' After extensive negotiations between Friedman, Morris, and the
Bank, Morris agreed to a three-year contract by which he was to serve as
president and CEO.'2
Morris requested that an attorney draft the agreement in the form of an
employment contract.' 4 The first draft of the contract contained a provision
obligating Morris to sell any Bank stock he acquired back to the Bank upon his
resignation or the expiration of his employment contract.6" Morris requested
an additional provision imposing on the Bank a reciprocal obligation to
repurchase, upon his departure, any shares he held." Both provisions were
included in the final draft of the employment contract.67
At trial, Morris alleged that during these contract negotiations Friedman
verbally promised to repurchase, in his individual capacity, any Bank stock
58. See, e.g., Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Kopanl, 514 N.E.2d 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1987);
Greenbaum v. Weinstein, 515 N.Y.S.2d 866 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 1987).
59. Whlteco Indus., 514 N.E.2d at 845.
60. Greenbaum. 515 N.Y.S.2d at 868 (citations omitted).
61. Metzger, supra note 10, at 64; Calamari and Perillo, supra note 31, at 843.
62. Morris v. Friedman, 663 So. 2d 19. 21 (La. 1995).
63. Id
64. Id
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id.
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Morris acquired during his employment with the Bank." These promises were
not reduced to a writing and Friedman denied their existence."9 During his
employment with the Bank, Morris purchased approximately $400,000 of stock
in the Bank and its subsequently-formed parent company, "Bancshares."'07
In 1987, upon the expiration of his employment agreement, Morris declared
his intent to resign from the Bank."1 Morris offered his shares to Friedman, the
Bank, and/or Bancshares.' Negotiations between Morris and Friedman for
Friedman's purchase of the shares failed to produce a sale of the stock."
In 1988, Morris resigned and requested that arrangements be made for the
repurchase of his stock shares in accordance with the terms of the employment
contract.74 The Bank refused on the basis that such a purchase would violate
Louisiana law.'5
In 1989, Morris filed suit against the Bank, Bancshares, and Friedman. 6
Seeking specific performance of the employment contract as well as damages,
Morris alleged breach of contract and detrimental reliance against the Bank,
Bancshares, and Friedman." In addition, Morris claimed breach of an oral
contract based on the failed 1987 repurchase negotiations between him and
Friedman. Prior to trial, the Bank was declared insolvent and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation was appointed as its receiver." A default
judgment in Morris' favor was entered against the receiver8" Morris voluntari-
ly dismissed Bancshares.8' Morris and Friedman subsequently proceeded to a
trial on the merits of Morris' claim of detrimental reliance based on Friedman's
alleged oral promises to repurchase Morris' shares.82
The trial jury found that (1) Friedman personally promised to purchase the
Bank shares owned by Morris; (2) the promises were made before Morris
acquired any shares; (3) Morris reasonably relied to his detriment upon
Friedman's promises in purchasing Bank stock; and (4) Morris sustained
damages of approximately $400,000.3
68. Id
69. Id
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id
73. Id at 22.
74. Id.
75. Id. The Bank cited La. R.S. 6:416 (1986), which prohibits a bank from purchasing or
owning its own stock, in support of its refusal to repurchase Morris' stock.
76. Morris, 663 So. 2d at 22.
77. Id
78. Id
79. Id.
80. Id
81. id
82. Id.
83. IdS
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In affirming the trial jury's ruling, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
relied on the Louisiana Civil Code's detrimental reliance provision contained in
Article 1967." The court noted that "La. C.C. art. 1967 does not require the
existence of a formal, valid, or enforceable contract in order for detrimental reliance
to occur." 85 Therefore, the court was not persuaded by Friedman's argument that
the Statute of Frauds requirement, as contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:8-
319(a),'6 prevented recognition of Morris' claim." In recognizing that this
Statute of Frauds provision regulated the enforceability of contracts, the court
emphasized that Friedman's oral promises did not establish the existence of a
contract, though it was sufficient to support a claim of detrimental reliance.'
Thus, the court concluded that Louisiana Revised Statutes 10:8-319 did not bar
Morris' recovery on the basis of detrimental reliance.'9
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the correctness
of the third circuit's ruling in light of Article 1967's detrimental reliance provision
and the requirements of Louisiana Revised Statues 10:8-319. 0
Justice Kimball, writing for the majority, began the court's analysis by
determining the applicable law. Noting that Friedman allegedly made the promises
in 1984 and that Article 1967 became effective January 1, 1985, the court first had
to determine whether Article 1967 should be applied retroactively.9 The court
recognized the well-settled rule of law that, absent extraordinary circumstances,
substantive law is to apply prospectively only, whereas procedural and interpretive
laws may be applied retroactively." As the Louisiana Legislature did not express
any intent as to whether Article 1967 should be applied retroactively or prospec-
tively, the court had to classify Article 1967 as substantive, procedural, or
interpretive. The court determined that "it is clear that La. C.C. art. 1967 is a
substantive law."
93
With respect to this issue, the court concluded as follows:
Since La.C.C. art. 1967 works a substantive change in the law which
cannot be applied retroactively, and the alleged promise by Friedman
upon which Morris' claim is based occurred prior to the effective date of
La.C.C. art. 1967, both the trial court and the court of appeal committed
legal error in applying Article 1967 to Morris' claim.
9 4
84. Morris v. People's Bank & Trust Co. of Natchitoches., 642 So. 2d 225,232-34 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1994). rev'd. 663 So. 2d 19 (1995). For the text of La. Civ. Code art. 1967, see supra note 6.
85. Morris. 642 So. 2d at 232 (citing its earlier decision in Morris v. People's Bank & Trust
Co. of Natchitoches, 580 So. 2d 1029, 1036 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 588 So. 2d 101 (1991)).
86. For the text of the statute, see supra text accompanying note 7.
87. Morris, 642 So. 2d at 233.
88. Id
89. Id
90. Morris v. Friedman. 663 So. 2d 19. 23 (La. 1995).
91. Id.
92. Id
93. id
94. Id at 23-24. Note that the alleged promises were made in 1984.
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Therefore, the issue facing the court was whether, under the law in effect prior
to January 1, 1985, a detrimental reliance claim would lie where a writing is
statutorily-required for the enforcement of the promise."5 Beginning its analysis
with the pre- 1985/pre-Article 1967 law of detrimental reliance, the court noted that
prior to the enactment of Article 1967 few Louisiana cases were framed in terms
of detrimental reliance."6 Of the casts that were, the court noted that most of them
involved gratuitous promises which were unenforceable due to lack of form."
Nevertheless, the courts in these cases held the seemingly gratuitous and
unenforceable promises to be enforceable by construing the promises as onerous."
The court emphasized that of the Louisiana cases framed in terms of detrimental
reliance, none involved "the application of detrimental reliance where there was the
additional consideration of a statutorily required writing requirement for the
promise or agreement at issue to be enforceable, and we have been unable to locate
any Louisiana case squarely presenting that issue.""
The court concluded:
We are confident, however, that had such a situation been encountered,
plaintiff's detrimental reliance on an onerous promise not made in the
statutorily required form would have been held, as in the case of a
gratuitous promise which did not meet the form requirements, entirely
unenforceable, even to the extent of plaintiffs reliance interest. This is
so because there is no logical distinction between the courts' absolute
unwillingness to enforce a gratuitous promise not made in the required
form and the enforcement of an onerous promise not made in the required
form. In both cases, a positive legal form requirement has been imposed
by legislation, and it has long been the rule that equity will not lie where
a positive legal requirement, not adhered to, exists."0 0
95. Id. at 24. Prior to January 1, 1985, claims for losses due to reasonable reliance on
another's representations were based on theories of detrimental reliance, equitable estoppel, and
promissory estoppel. Id.
96. Id
97. Id. (citing Louisiana College v. Keller, 10 La. 164 (1836) and Baptist Hospital v. Cappel,
129 So. 425 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1930)).
98. Id. The courts in these cases construed the promises to be onerous by identifying some
benefit or advantage that the promisor would possibly receive by fufilling the promise. For example,
in Louisiana College v. Keller, 10 La. 164 (1836), the defendant/promisor had made a promise of
a gift to a local university. In finding the promise to be onerous in nature, the court noted that the
promisor might have expected the benefit of having a university near his home at which to educate
his children.
99. Morris, 663 So. 2d at 25.
100. Id. (citing Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So. 2d 482 (La.
1990) and Packard Florida Motors Co. v. Malone, 24 So. 2d 75 (La. 1945)).
Justice Kimball noted in a footnote that the addition of Article 1967 "may very well alter this
analysis." Id at n. 11. However, as Article 1967 was not the applicable law in the case at bar, the
court did not reach this issue. Id.
The court also concluded that Morris could not recover on the bases of equitable estoppel and
promissory estoppel. Id at 25-26. As to the denial of recovery under equitable estoppel, the court
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Thus, the court, in an 8-1 decision, held that "there can be no recovery on the
basis of equity where... a positive statutory writing requirement, not adhered
to, exists."'0 '
VII. ARTICLE 1967 AND ONEROUS PROMISES LACKING A WRITING
Article 1967 makes it clear that "reliance on a gratuitous promise made
without required formalities is not reasonable. ' (*° However, as previously
noted, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in applying pre-1985 law to the facts of
Morris, left unanswered the question of whether an aggreived promisee can
recover, under Article 1967, for reliance on an onerous promise not made in the
statutorily-required form. Stated alternatively in the language of Article 1967,
is reliance on an onerous promise made without required formalities "reasonable"
or "unreasonable" reliance?
I contend that recovery should be allowed to an aggreived promisee who
reasonably relies on an onerous promise, despite the lack of a statutorily-required
writing. This view is supported by three items: (1) existing jurisprudence
interpreting Article 1967; (2) a logical interpretation of Article 1967; and (3) the
intent of the Louisiana State Law Institute and the Louisiana Legislature in
enacting Article 1967.
A. Jurisprudence
In Morris, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that Article
1967 "does not require the existence of a formal, valid, or enforceable contract
in order for detrimental reliance to occur."'03 The third circuit further stated
that "detrimental reliance is not really contractual in nature"; thus, the pertinent
inquiry is not whether an enforceable contract exists, but rather "whether the
promise was made in such a manner that the promisor knew or should have
known that the promisee would rely on it, and if so, whether the promisee has
in fact reasonably relied upon the promise and been damaged thereby."'"
noted Morris' failure to prove that Friedman made any representations to the effect that the promises
need not be in writing to be enforceable. Id. at 26. In addition, citing Palermo Land Co. v. Planning
Comm'n of Calcasleu Parish, 561 So. 2d 482, 488 (La. 1990). the court held that "equitable
considerations and estoppel cannot prevail when in conflict with the positive written law." 663 So.
2d at 26. As to recovery under promissory estoppel, the court did not discuss the merits of recovery
under such a theory, noting that the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly rejected the common law
theory of promissory estoppel In Ducote v. Oden, 59 So. 2d 130 (La. 1952). 663 So. 2d at 26.
101. Morris, 663 So. 2d at 26.
102. La. Civ. Code art. 1967 (emphasis added).
103. Morris v. People's Bank & Trust Co., 642 So. 2d 225, 232 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994) (citing
its earlier decision in Morris v. People's Bank & Trust Co.. 580 So. 2d 1029, 1036 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 588 So. 2d 101 (1991) (emphasis added)).
. 104. Id (citing Adcock, supra note 20, at 765-66).
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As previously noted, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in granting certiorari, did
not analyze the case under the provisions of Article 1967; rather, the court
applied the pre-1985 law of detrimental reliance. In a footnote, the court
acknowledged that Article 1967 may alter its analysis; however, since it decided
the case under pre-Article 1967 law, it expressed no opinion as to whether
Article 1967 would yield a different result under the Morris facts.'"5
Therefore, while the court held that both the trial and appellate courts
committed "legal error" in applying Article 1967 to the facts of Morris,'06 it did
not express an opinion (and expressly chose not to do so) on the correctness of the
third circuit's holding that recovery under Article 1967 detrimental reliance does
not require the existence of a formal, valid, or enforceable contract.!"7
One might assert that an implicit overruling of the third circuit's holding
occured in the supreme court's statement that "[e]quitable considerations and
estoppel cannot be permitted to prevail when in conflict with the positive written
law."'8 It should be noted, however, that with the enactment of Article 1967,
detrimental reliance also became "positive law" which should be accorded status
equal to that of the statutory writing requirements 9 .The official comments
to Article 1967, which state that detrimental reliance is an "additional ground for
enforceability" of obligations, support this view."0
Therefore, the third circuit's reasoning in Morris appears to remain viable.
Furthermore, its holding has received support from at least one other Louisiana
court. Although not a case involving a statutory writing requirement, the United
States Federal District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana applied Article
1967 in Percy J. Matherne Contractor, Inc. v. Grinnel Fire Protection Systems
Co."' The Matherne court cited the third circuit in holding that a "cause of
action for detrimental reliance does not depend upon the existence of a valid,
enforceable contract."'"2 Rather, the court stated, recovery under Article 1967
requires only "the existence of a promise and a reasonable reliance on that
105. Morris v. Friedman, 663 So. 2d 19, 25 n. I I (La. 1995). In this footnote, the court stated:
The addition of La.C.C. art. 1967 in the Civil Code as an additional ground for
enforceability of obligations may well alter this analysis. However, since this case is
decided under the law existing prior to the effective date of La.C.C. art. 1967, we need
not decide, and express no opinion herein, whether the existence of La.C.C. art. 1967
would yield a different result under the facts presented in this case were it applicable.
106. Morris. 663 So. 2d at 24.
107. See supra note 105 for footnote 11 of the court's opinion, in which the court refuses to rule
on the correctness of the third circuit's holding as to recovery under Article 1967.
108. Morris, 663 So. 2d at 26 (citing Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Comm'n of Calcasleu
Parish, 561 So. 2d 482, 488 (La. 1990)).
109. Per La. Civ. Code art. I and the official comments thereto, legislation is a primary source
of law and is superior to any other source of law. Thus, as Article 1967 and the statutory writing
requirements are both "legislation" and are "superior" sources of the law, they should be accorded
equal status.
110. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967 cmt. a.
111. 915 F. Supp. 818 (M.D. La. 1995), aff'd, 102 F.3d 550 (5th Cir.' 1996).
112. Id. at 824.
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promise to one's detriment."' These are the same requisites set forth by the
Morris court. The Morris and Matherne courts' delineation of the requirements
for recovery under Article 1967 detrimental reliance have been echoed in other
Louisiana decisions as well."4
Therefore, applying the interpretation of Article 1967 as set forth by
Louisiana appellate courts anda federal district court, a promisee who reasonably
relies to his detriment on an onerous promise should be allowed to recover,
despite the lack of a statutorily-required writing.
B. Statutory Interpretation
A "plain reading" of the terms of Article 1967 further supports the view that
Article 1967 requires only a "promise" and "reasonable reliance" in order for an
aggreived promisee to recover and does not require a valid and enforceable
contract."5  Article 1967 speaks in terms of a "promise" and not of a "con-
tract."" 6 Furthermore, though the comments to Article 1967 are not part of
the law,"? comment (a) is additional "persuasive" authority for the statement
that Article 1967 provides a basis for the enforceability of obligations in addition
to contract.'
Further statutory support of this view is found in Louisiana Civil Code
article 9 which states: "When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application
does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no
further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature.""1
9
Article 1967 provides an exception for reliance on a gratuitous promise not made
in the statutorily-required form; it does not, however, provide such an exception
for onerous promises not made in the statutorily-required form. Hence, it seems
"clear and unambiguous" that an aggreived promisee reasonably relying on such
an onerous promise should be allowed to recover. Such a result would not lead
to "absurd consequences," for our common law cousins would likely allow
recovery in such a scenario.'"
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Carter v. Huber & Heard, Inc., 657 So. 2d 409, 411 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 661 So. 2d 471 (1995) (stating "[riecovery of damages therefore requires (a) the existence
of a promise and (b) reasonable reliance on that promise to one's detriment"); South Central Bell
Telephone Co. v. Rouse Co. of Louisiana, 590 So. 2d 801. 804 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (stating "ft]o
recover under the theory of detrimental reliance it must be proven that: I) a representation was
made; 2) there was justifiable reliance on that representation; 3) a change In position to one's
detriment because of that reliance").
115. La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
116. Id.
117. 1984 La. Acts No. 331. § 9.
118. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967 cmt. a.
119. La. Civ. Code art. 9.
120. See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 and § 139 (1979). See also the
discussion of the common law's treatment of this issue at supra text accompanying notes 45-61.
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Furthermore, there should be nothing "absurd" in the recognition of two
distinct bases of recovery: one in contract, and one in detrimental reliance.
Stated otherwise, why not allow the two bases of recovery, both legislative
pronouncements, to coexist? Official comment (a) to Article 1967 provides a
form of legislative support for this proposition in noting that Article 1967 is "an
additional ground for enforceability" of promises.' Of course, the strongest
evidence of legislative support would be the Louisiana Legislature's decision to
incorporate both bases of recovery into the Civil Code.
By way of analogy, one can also find judicial support for the proposition
that the contractual and detrimental reliance bases should be allowed to coexist.
In Tedesco v. Gentry Development, Inc.,'22 the Louisiana Supreme Court
recognized that in a sale of immovable property written authority is required for
an agent to execute either an agreement to sell or a contract of sale on behalf of
his principal.'" However, the court noted that in an appropriate case a
principal may be estopped from asserting the defense of lack of written authority
if the third person can show a change of position in reliance on the principal's
oral representation of the agent's authority. 1"4 That is, if the third person can
prove the elements of "agency by estoppel," a judicially-created basis of
recovery, then the third person may enforce the contract against the principal
despite the lack of a written grant of authority to the agent.
Thus, the Tedesco court recognized that there are two distinct bases of
recovery for an aggreived party in the agency scenario: (1) contract; and (2)
agency by estoppel.'2 The court saw "no absurdity" in allowing the two to
coexist. I concede that the analogy to Tedesco is not a perfect one, as Tedesco
involved a judicial theory modifying a legislative rule and the proposition herein
set forth involves two legislative pronouncements. However, a court wishing to
recognize contract and Article 1967 detrimental reliance as distinct, coexisting
bases of recovery would seem to be in a stronger position than the Tedesco
court, as both bases are legislative pronouncements and legislation is the superior
source of law in Louisiana.' 26
Therefore, by way of a "plain reading" of the terms of Article 1967, a
promisee who reasonably relies to his detriment on an onerous promise should
be allowed to recover, despite the lack of a statutorily-required writing.
Furthermore, because the terms of Article 1967 are clear and unambiguous, the
Civil Code mandates that Article 1967 be applied as written and that no further
interpretation be made. Finally, the proposition that there should be two distinct
bases of recovery available to the aggreived promisee (contract and detrimental
121. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967 cmt. a. As previously noted, the official comments are not part
of Louisiana's law. 1984 La. Acts No. 331, § 9.
122. 540 So. 2d 960 (La. 1989).
123. Id at 964 (citing La. Civ. Code arts 2996, 2997, and 2440).
124. Id
125. Id. at 964-65.
126. La. Civ. Code art. 1.
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reliance) is supported by: (1) the Civil Code and the official comments thereto;
and (2) Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence.
C. Legislative Intent
As legislation is the superior source of law in Louisiana, 127 perhaps the
most persuasive support for allowing recovery to the aggreived promisee who
relied on an onerous promise lacking in form is that of legislative intent.
As previously noted, the common law theory of promissory estoppel is the
doctrine the Louisiana State Law Institute asked the chief drafter of the 1984
revision to incorporate into the Civil Code.'28  However, the essence of
promissory estoppel captured in the chief drafter's first draft was abrogated when
other Law Institute members requested the addition of a last sentence to Article
1967.129 This last sentence, part of the final draft enacted by the Louisiana
Legislature, states: "Reliance on a gratuitous promise made without required
formalities is not reasonable."'" The motive behind the addition of the last
sentence was to make it "as clear as possible that reliance on a donation
promised without proper form will not be protected."' 13'
Therefore, given the motive of the Law Institute (as expressed in the
reporter's notes) and the pattern of modifications made to the last sentence of
Article 1967, it appears that the Law Institute intended to allow recovery for
reasonable reliance on an onerous promise lacking a statutorily-required writing.
The Law Institute had the opportunity to treat onerous and gratuitous promises
that lack form equally (and deny recovery to aggreived promisees relying on
either) when it was presented with the preliminary draft containing the last
sentence:- "Reliance on a promise made without required formalities is not
reasonable."" 2  It chose to distinguish between the two types of promises,
however, by adding the word "gratuitous" to the last sentence.'3
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that it was the intent of the Louisiana
Legislature, in drafting and enacting Article 1967, to allow a promisee who
reasonably relied on an onerous promise, despite the lack of a statutorily-required
writing, to recover.
VIII. RESULT OF MORRIS UNDER ARTICLE 1967?
Under the law in effect today, promisee Morris should be allowed to recover
under Article 1967 detrimental reliance, in spite of the lack of a statutorily-
127. La. Civ. Code art. 1. See also La. Civ. Code art. I cmt. a.
128. Adcock, supra note 20, at 754.
129. See supra notes 22-25.
130. La. Civ. Code art. 1967. See Law Institute Minutes, supra note 26.
131. Litvinoff, supra note 22, at 1.
132. Litvinoff. supra note 22.
133. Law Institute Minutes, supra note 26.
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required writing, if he were able to prove: (1) that a promise existed; (2) that the
promisor Friedman knew or should have known that the promise would induce
him to rely on it to his detriment; and (3) that he was reasonable in so relying
on the promise.'
Requisites (1) and (2) are present in the facts of Morris. Therefore, the
pivotal issue would be whether Morris was "reasonable" in relying on Fried-
man's promises. This is obviously a question of fact for the fact finder to
resolve. In a recent Louisiana case that attempted to give meaning to the phrase
"reasonable reliance," the court held that the promisee's business knowledge and
expertise are factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the
promisee's reliance on a promise. 35
Although the promisee's failure to have the onerous promise put into writing
should not automatically disqualify the promisee from recovery under Article
1967, Friedman could still allege that Morris "unreasonably relied" on his oral
promises by not having the promises reduced to a writing as required by statute.
Two facts support such an allegation of "unreasonable reliance": (1) Morris'
status as bank president and chief executive officer, and his education, training,
and expertise resulting from such experience; and (2) Morris' insistence that the
reciprocal purchase/sell agreement between him and the bank be reduced to
writing and incorporated into their employment contract.
As these two facts indicate that Morris knew or should have known of the
statutory writing requirement for sales of securites, I conclude that Morris was
"unreasonable" in relying on Friedman's promises and should therefore be denied
recovery.36
IX. CONCLUSION
With the enactment of Louisiana Civil Code article 1967 in 1984 came the
first legislative recognition of the doctrine of detrimental reliance in Louisiana.
While expressly disallowing recovery for reliance on a gratuitous promise not
made in the statutorily-required form, Article 1967 leaves unanswered the
question of whether an aggreived promisee can recover for reasonable reliance
on an onerous promise not made in the statutorily-required form.
I contend that recovery should be granted to such a promisee for reasonable
reliance on an onerous promise, despite the lack of a statutorily-required writing.
A "plain reading" interpretation of Article 1967 supports this view. This view
is further supported by an examination of the intent of the Louisiana Legislature
in drafting and enacting Article 1967. Such an examination reveals that the
134. Elements adapted from La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
135. Academy Mortgage Co.. L.L.P. v. Barker, Boudreaux, Lamy. & Foley, 673 So. 2d 1209
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1996).
136. Note that Morris' reliance would likely be deemed "reasonable" if there were no statutory
writing requirement for the sale or purchase of securities, as is the law in Louisiana today. For the
text of La. R.S. 10:8-113 (1983). see supra note 8.
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legislature considered disallowing recovery to a promisee relying on either a
gratuitous or onerous promise lacking form. However, as the enacted version of
Article 1967 shows, the legislature chose to disallow recovery to only those
promisees relying on gratuitous promises lacking form. Finally, the decisions
of Louisiana appellate courts and a federal district court support the view that
recovery under Article 1967 requires only the existence of an onerous promise
and reasonable reliance thereon.
Given the frequency and volume of contracts in commerce and the
unfortunate tendency of parties to conduct their affairs via "handshake" deals and
oral contracts, the issue left unanswered by Article 1967, and which the Morris
court chose not to address, will certainly arise again. What will not be certain
is the proper result in a Morris-type situation where the onerous contract has not
been reduced to a statutorily-required writing, one party has reasonably relied to
its detriment on the other party's promise of performance, and the promising
party renegs. Should the injured promisee recover? Or should the promisor be
able to assert the lack of a statutorily-required writing as a defense to liability?
This uncertainty should be resolved in favor of the aggreived promisee. The
terms of Article 1967 as presently written, the jurisprudence interpreting Article
1967, and an examination of the legislature's intent in enacting Article 1967 all
support this view. Of course, the Louisiana Legislature could eliminate the
uncertainty it created by amending Article 1967 so as to expressly allow or
disallow recovery to promisees relying on onerous promises lacking a statutorily-
required form.
Amos J. Oelking III
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